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This paper studies quality choice in a model where consumers expect firms (or brands) to act altruistically.
Under plausible assumptions regarding this altruism and the reaction of consumers to firms that demonstrate
insufficient altruism, existing brands can face a larger demand for new products than new entrants.
Moreover, the failure of new products can reduce the demand for a brand's existing products even
if the quality of these existing products is well understood by consumers. The model provides an interpretation
for the dependence of the success of brand extensions on the ``fit" between the original product and
the extension. The model can also explain why a ``high-end" brand that is expected to care only for
its most quality sensitive customers can have an advantage in introducing a product relative to a brand
that is expected to be more widely altruistic.
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jrotemberg@hbs.eduWhile there exists an extensive theoretical literature on quality provision, the role of
altruism from ¯rms to consumers in the supply of quality appears to have been completely
neglected. This paper seeks to ¯ll this gap. It should be intuitive that this kind of altruism
can contribute to quality in the case of experience goods, where consumers only learn the
quality of the good after purchasing it. Managers (and employees) of altruistic ¯rms obtain
vicarious bene¯ts when consumers have a good experience after buying their goods. The
result is that, relative to sel¯sh ¯rms, they have more to gain from from providing a good
of higher quality.
The literature's neglect of this straightforward mechanism of quality enhancement may
be due to skepticism about the relevance of altruism on the part of ¯rms. It is worth noting,
however, that ¯rms's mission statements routinely assert their desire to serve customers.1
Consumers also appear to expect some suppliers to care for them, as evidenced by their
reactions when companies disappoint them. Fournier (1998, p. 355) discusses a consumer
she calls \Karen" who, recollecting a design change Mary Kay Cosmetics said: \I remember
feeling, `how could they do that to me?'." Similarly, the price cut of Apple's iPhone in 2007
led one customer to describe his reaction as \a feeling of betrayal of trust by a corporation
I adored."2
Consumers know ¯rms principally through their brands, and this paper tries to analyze
some sources and some consequences of consumer's expectations regarding brand altruism.
Since altruistic ¯rms provide higher quality goods, a consumer who is impressed by the
quality of her purchase should come to expect more altruism towards her from the brand
under which this good is sold. As a result, she should expect high quality when this brand
launches a new good (\a brand extension") that is also directed at her. This raises the
demand for brand extensions, and this e®ect should be particularly strong when, as in
Rotemberg (2010), consumers become angry if they are able to reject the hypothesis that a
1For example, the well publicized Johnson & Johnson \credo" starts with the words \We believe our
¯rst responsibility is to the doctors, nurses and patients, to mothers and fathers and all others who use our
products and services." Other examples can be found in Abrahams (2004).
2See http://www.cultofmac.com/breaking-apple-gives-100-credit-to-iphone-early-adopters/1206
1supplier has the level of altruism that they expect.3
Interestingly, expected quality need not be a monotonic function of the number of con-
sumers a ¯rm is expected to be altruistic towards. I show, in particular, that extensions
introduced by \high-end" brands who are seen as caring only for connoisseurs can be more
desirable than similar extensions by brands that are perceived as caring also for less quality-
sensitive consumers.
One aim of this paper is to rationalize several empirical ¯ndings from the marketing
literature on brand extensions which, when taken together, seem di±cult to reconcile with
existing formal models. The marketing literature has repeatedly shown that, at least in
the laboratory, two attributes of brand extensions are signi¯cant predictors of consumer
acceptance. The ¯rst is that the original brand be liked (or seen as having high quality)
and the second is that the extension \¯t" with the original brand (Aaker and Keller (1990),
Broniarczyck and Alba (1993)). As Klink and Smith (2001) note, the concept of \¯t" is not
very precisely de¯ned in this literature.4
In the real-world examples of successful extensions described in Keller (1998), two types
of ¯t predominate. First, several successful extensions depend on an input that also plays a
key role in the original product. Examples of this include Hershey chocolate milk and Honda
lawnmowers. In these cases, consumers may believe that the technological knowledge used
to make the original product is helpful in making a high-quality extension. In a second set
of examples, the technologies used in the two products are unrelated but the target market
is similar. In these cases, altruism for the customers of the original product should extend
to those for the new product as well. A good example of this is provided by the successful
extension of Aunt Jemima, a brand focused initially on dry pancake mixes, into pancake
syrup. Another is the extension of the toothpaste brand Colgate into toothbrushes.
In these two examples, the extension is meant to be used at the same time as the original
3See Anderson and Simester (2010) for evidence that consumers react in this way to ¯rms that whose
prices lead them to regret their earlier purchases.
4Klink and Smith (2001, p. 333-34) note, in particular that \This raises a more general and critical point,
however, related to construing perceived ¯t. If knowledge in this area is to progress in a meaningful manner,
it would be useful to arrive at some consensus about how to de¯ne and measure the perceived ¯t construct."
2product. Target customers seem to be similar also in less straightforward cases. Broniarczyk
and Alba (1993) show that their undergraduate survey respondents regard a potential exten-
sion of the Close-Up brand of toothpaste into breath mints as more attractive than a similar
extension by Crest.5 By contrast, an extension by Crest into toothbrushes was regarded
more favorably than a similar extension by Close Up.6 Broniarczyk and Alba (1993) also
observed statistically signi¯cant di®erences between the attractiveness of category extensions
by the cereals brands Cheerios and Froot Loops. While consumers said they would be more
attracted by an oatmeal o®ering from the former, they were more likely to be favorably
impressed by a lollipop o®ering from Froot Loops.
There does seem to be more overlap between the target market for lollipops (parents
who enjoy buying sweets for their children) and the target market for Froot Loops than
there is between the target market for Cheerios and that of lollipops. Similarly, the target
market for Cheerios appears relatively similar to the target market for oatmeal. In the case
of toothpastes, Close Up seems directed at people who are particularly concerned with the
smell of their breath (who should be the target market for breath mints) while the target
market for Crest seems more concerned with health and hygiene.
My basic assumption that consumers imbue brands with intentions ¯ts with Fournier
(1998, p. 345) who says \Another form of animism involves complete anthropomorphization
of the brand object itself, with transference of the human qualities of emotionality, thought,
and volition." The attribution of intentions to a brand \object" may seem like a particularly
extreme form of irrationality. It is important to remember, however, that the behavior of
brands is governed by people and these people may indeed have intentions vis-a-vis their
customers. It may thus not be entirely irrational to suppose that a brand that sells a well-
liked product is managed by people with a particularly large degrees of empathy for the
customers that most enjoy this product.7
5Interestingly, these survey respondents regarded Close-Up as being less attractive than Crest as a tooth-
paste, suggesting that the attractiveness of extensions does not depend on a unidimensional indicator of
\quality."
6Crest did enter the toothbrush market around 1992.
7If people di®er in the groups that they most empathize with, this di®erence in tastes presumably a®ects
3An alternative hypothesis is that customers do not regard brands as having intentions but
see them as having only capabilities, where these capabilities may include their knowledge
of consumer tastes. Consumers might reason, for example, that brands which have demon-
strated superior knowledge in the past by providing a high quality good would be particularly
adept at producing complementary goods that are valuable to the same consumers. More-
over, the pursuit of pro¯ts would provide these ¯rms with an incentive to provide such goods.
Consumers would thus be able to count on the attractiveness of \related" category extensions
by successful brands.
One way of di®erentiating between the view that brands are treated as capabilities and the
view that they are seen as having intentions is to analyze the purchases of a brand's original
products in those cases where category extensions fail. If consumers bought products only on
the basis of their beliefs about a ¯rm's capabilities, they would not reduce their purchases of
existing products unless the failure of the extension conveyed information about the quality
of the existing product. By contrast, if consumers care about ¯rm intentions, their experience
with a brand extension can lead them to reevaluate a brand's intentions and reduce their
purchases of existing products.
Two studies suggest that consumers do reduce their purchases of existing products when
new product carrying the same brand fail. Sullivan (1990) shows that, after the Audi 5000
was accused of having a problem with sudden acceleration, the demand for other Audi cars
fell. This was true even of the Audi Quattro, which used a di®erent technology that was not
associated with any acceleration problem. It could be argued, however, that consumers did
not know enough about automobile technology to be certain of these di®erences across Audi
cars. The second study involves a product that customers knew better. Using scanner data,
Swaminathan et al (2001) examined the demand for a food product that had had a 53%
market share in its category before its manufacturer introduced an unrelated extension that
was withdrawn after 18 months. Swaminathan et al (2001) show that individuals who had
the employer that people most wish to work for. Workers should, in particular, °ock to those ¯rms whose
products are particularly well-liked by the groups that they feel close to.
4bought the extension were signi¯cantly less likely to buy the original product afterwards.
If the failure of an extension changes the perceived quality of the original product, this
reduction in demand can be rationalized with the formal models of Wernerfelt (1988) and
Cabral (2000). In these models, consumers are uncertain about the quality of a brand's
initial (or °agship) product. When the brand introduces an extension, consumers obtain a
signal of the new product's quality. If this signal is adverse, so that consumers judge the
extension to be of low quality, they reduce their demand for the °agship product because
they reduce their estimate's of this product's quality.
In fact, many unsuccessful extensions do not appear to a®ect the demand for the original
product. Consistent with this, my model predicts that the demand for the original product
should be una®ected if the original product and the extension target di®erent consumer
segments. In this case, the perception of altruism for the purchasers of the original product
is not contradicted by the failed extension.
A second advantage of focusing on altruism relative to quality is Roedder-John, Loken and
Joiner's (1998) demonstration that the perceived quality of °agship products is fairly resilient
in consumers' minds.8 They show that the attributes that subjects attribute to a °agship
brand (Johnson & Johnson Baby Shampoo) are essentially impervious to the introduction
of dissonant extensions carrying the same brand name. It is also possible to be somewhat
skeptical a priori of the idea that consumers change their mind about a product that they
have consumed repeatedly (which is their typical experience with well-known branded goods)
after a short experience with a new product from the same brand. This is particularly true
when the extension does not share any inputs with the original good.
As demonstrated in Choi (1998), if one modi¯es the Wernerfelt (1988) and Cabral (2000)
8They build on an extensive earlier literature (see for example, Keller and Aaker (1992) and Loken and
Roedder-John (1993), Pina et al. (2006)) that focused on subjects' overall ratings of brands after these are
described to them as having introduced either successful or failed extensions. This literature did not always
¯nd statistically signi¯cant e®ects. Loken and Roedder-John (1993) showed that subjects who are told that
a brand has introduced an ungentle or low-quality product do sometimes reduce the degree to which they
subsequently associate a brand with \gentleness" or \high quality." But this says little about the attitudes of
subjects towards the original product, since their overall brand evaluation is presumably a mixture of their
evaluation of the original product and their judgment regarding the extension.
5models so that quality judgments of the original product are una®ected by failed extensions,
the demand for the existing product is una®ected as well. The result is that the use of an
existing brand in a new product loses some of its signaling value.9
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 introduces the structure of the model and
analyzes the market for an existing good, which can act as a hostage when a new good is
introduced by an existing brand. Section 2 studies the introduction of a new good by a
new ¯rm, and demonstrates that this ¯rm is more likely to produce a high quality good if
it is altruistic. This sets the stage for section 3, which studies the provision of quality by a
¯rm that consumers expect to act altruistically. Section 4 considers ¯rms that di®er in the
breadth of altruism that consumers expect from them. Section 5 presents some concluding
remarks.
1 The Old Good
The structure of the model is close to Wernerfelt (1988) and Cabral (2000). There are three
periods 0, 1 and 2. In periods 0 and 2, an incumbent ¯rm is the monopoly provider of an
\old" good with known quality. In period 1, either the incumbent or another ¯rm can start
production of a new good. Before they produce, entrants determine the quality of their good,
where higher quality is more costly. Consumers do not learn this quality until after they
purchase the good in period 1. In period 2, this new good is available for sale once again.
This timing is illustrated in Table 1.
As in Rotemberg (2008, 2010), consumer j's utility Uj depends on his material payo®s
xj, on the material payo®s of the ¯rm he purchases from ¼, on his altruism towards the ¯rm
aj and on his assessment of the extent to which the ¯rm acts altruistically towards him. In
particular
Uj = xj + (aj ¡ »(¹ aj;^ a))¼; (1)
9In Choi's (1998) model, branding can still signal high quality because ¯rms have a repeated choice
between high and low quality extensions. There is then a reputational equilibrium where brands introduce
only high quality extensions. While this is an attractive model, it should be noted that it would need to be
modi¯ed to be consistent with the common failure of newly introduced products.
6where aj denotes his direct altruism towards the ¯rm and the function » takes a value of
zero if given the information set ^ a, consumers cannot reject the hypothesis that the ¯rm acts
as if it had an altruism parameter greater than or equal to ¹ aj. Otherwise, » equals ¹ » > 0.
For simplicity, aj is set equal to zero. A fraction ° of consumers is \altruism aware" and has
¹ aj = ¹ a > 0. For the rest, ¹ aj = 0.
Let ¼i
j and Bi
j denote, respectively, the pro¯ts and consumer surplus from the sale of the
good of type i in period j while a is a parameter giving a ¯rm's true altruism towards its
consumers. The distribution of ¯rms' actual altruism parameters is given by the pdf Ga. For
simplicity, discounting is ignored in this section and the three periods are assumed to be of
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i and i = 1;2:
In both these formulas, a ¯rm values a unit of consumer surplus by a times the amount it
values a unit of pro¯ts. Finally, an incumbent ¯rm that produces both the old and the new
good, has a welfare level W, which equals W 0 + W n.
There are Ko potential consumers for the old good. The incremental material payo®
from consuming one unit of the good rather than none equals Ã, where this is drawn from
a distribution with pdf FÃ. Individuals gain nothing by buying additional units.
It is convenient to begin the analysis with period 2. Suppose ¯rst that » = 0 for all
consumers so that they are all \calm" and base their purchases exclusively on their material
payo®s. If the seller charges po
2, all consumers with Ã ¸ po
2 buy the good so that total sales
equal Ko(1 ¡ FÃ(po
2)). I simplify the analysis by supposing that FÃ is uniform between 0
and Y so sales would equal Ko(1 ¡ (po
2=Y )).













7Let co be the constant cost of producing one unit. Consider a ¯rm that acts as if its
altruism parameter were ao


























After multiplying through by Y , the ¯rst order condition for this problem is
2p
o




2) = co; (4)











The derivative of this price with respect to ao
2 equals (co ¡ Y )=(2 ¡ ao
2)2, which is negative
since the maximum willingness to pay Y must exceed marginal cost.
Rotemberg (2010) considers a signaling game where ¯rms signal their altruism level
through their price. He shows that, regardless of the distribution of types Ga, there is
a unique equilibrium where ¯rms whose actual altruism equals ¹ a charge po¤
2 (¹ a;co). His
demonstration relies on the assumption that a fraction greater than or equal to ® of ¯rms
whose altruism truly equals ¹ a are naive in the sense that they neglect the e®ect of their price
on consumers' inference regarding their altruism. The fraction ® is the size of the test that
altruism-aware consumers use to test the hypothesis that ¯rms' altruism equals at least ¹ a. I
neglect these details here and simply assume that altruism-aware consumers accept the price
of po¤
2 (¹ a;co) as indicating su±cient altruism. Firms with an altruism level of ¹ a then charge
this price, so that a statistician would not reject the null hypothesis that a ¯rm charging
po¤
2 (¹ a;co) does indeed have an altruism level of ¹ a.
A higher price, on the other hand, immediately causes this hypothesis to be rejected
so that altruism-aware consumers respond by setting » = ¹ ». These consumers then cease
purchasing as long as ¹ » is large enough and price exceeds marginal cost, so that pro¯ts rise
with each additional purchase. Whenever a ¯rm's altruism parameter is less than one, which
I assume, this latter condition is satis¯ed since charging a price below marginal cost would
8not be optimal. Thus, the assumption that ¹ » is large enough ensures that a ¯rm that charges
more than po¤
2 (¹ a;co) loses a fraction ° of its customers and faces a demand for its product
equal to (1 ¡ °)Ko(1 ¡ po
2=Y ). If it has an altruism parameter a < ¹ a its objective function
becomes (1 ¡ °)W o
2(a;co;po
2) and its welfare maximizing price equals po¤
2 (a;co). Such a ¯rm
therefore charges po¤
















(1 ¡ °)(Y ¡ co)2







and the second equality is established in the Appendix. Notice that ¢(a;co) is unambiguously
rising in the altruism parameter a. A more altruistic ¯rm has more to lose from the reduction
in demand by (1 ¡ °) because it obtains more utility from each unit that it sells.
To simplify the analysis, I suppose from now on that ¯rms are either sel¯sh so that a = 0
or their altruism a equals the level ¹ a > 0 that is expected by altruism-aware consumers. The
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It is apparent from this that, as long as ° > 0, there exists a positive level of altruism ¹ a such
that ¢(0;co) > 0. Rotemberg (2010) shows numerically that fairly modest levels of ° lead
to ¢(0;co) > 0 for nontrivial levels of ¹ a.
I complete the analysis of period 2 by considering the case where altruism-aware con-
sumers were able to reject the hypothesis a ¯rm's altruism level was greater than or equal
to ¹ a in earlier periods. By assumption, this implies that these consumers set » equal to ¹ » in
the second period regardless of the ¯rm's current price. While this assumption is somewhat
stark, it can be interpreted as resulting from consumers being unable to remember the de-
tails of a ¯rm's earlier violation and remembering only whether it was large enough to reject
the null hypothesis of altruism. The demand for such a ¯rm is thus (1 ¡ °)Ko(1 ¡ po
2=Y ).
This implies that a ¯rm with altruism parameter ¹ a that takes an action before period 2 that
9allows altruism-aware consumers to reject the hypothesis that it is in fact altruistic incurs a
period 2 cost of ¢(¹ a;co). As we shall see below, this cost of being seen as sel¯sh contributes
to the provision of high quality new goods.
If one ignores the possibility of introducing a new good, the analysis of the equilibrium
price of the old good in period 0 turns out to be identical to the pricing analysis we just saw
for period 2. I skip the analysis of this market, however. The reason is that it is inessential
for the main purpose of this paper, which is to study the quality of new goods in period 1.
2 The Provision of a New Good by New Entrant
There are Kn potential consumers for this good. Each of these buys at most a single unit.
If the new good is of low quality, its value to all consumers equals L. A newly introduced
high quality good, by contrast, is valued di®erently by di®erent consumers. Let µ denote this
valuation where µ is drawn from the pdf Fµ. To express the utility received by consumers,
let Ih and I` be indicator functions that take a value of 1 if the consumer buys a high quality
new good or a low quality new good respectively. Otherwise, these indicator functions equal
0. Since consumers cannot buy more than one of these goods, at most one of these indicator
functions can equal 1. Supposing that the consumer pays pn
1 for a newly introduced good,






In period 1, a potential entrant has a probability ¯ < 1 of having the capacity to produce
a new good that competes in this market. In other words, there is an indicator variable
¾H, which equals 1 with probability ¯ and equals zero otherwise. When it equals zero,
the potential entrant is unable to produce such a good. By contrast, when it equals 1, the
potential entrant can produce one of the two goods whose demand was described above. The
reason to set ¯ < 1 is to ensure that, as in real-world markets, new goods are not introduced
in every period. From a modeling point of view, it implies that the non-introduction of a
good by an incumbent ¯rm is not informative about the ¯rm's altruism. Even so, most of the
10analysis is concerned with situations where ¾H = 1 so that ¯rms have a nontrivial product
introduction decision.
For simplicity, I suppose that both the high and the low quality new goods have the same
marginal cost of production ¹ c. There is, however, a di®erence in the cost of the two goods in
that the high quality good has a setup cost · while the low quality good involves no setup
cost. Consumers do not know the quality of the new good in period 1 though they do learn
it in time for making purchases in period 2.
2.1 Period 2
The analysis is simpli¯ed by supposing that ¹ c > L so that low quality new goods are su±-
ciently unattractive that consumers are not willing to pay their marginal cost of production.
As a result, sellers of a new good that is known to be of low quality in period 2 cannot sell
this good pro¯tably. It turns out to be convenient to let ² denote ¹ c ¡ L, the excess of the
cost of production relative to the consumers' valuation of this good. In a sense to be made
precise below, I focus on situations where ² is relatively small.
If the new good is known in period 2 to be of high quality, people with µ ¸ pn
2 increase







As in the case of FÃ, the analysis is simpli¯ed if Fµ is set to be uniform between 0 and Y .
Indeed, the analysis is then the same as that for the old good in period 2. The demand
curve in (8) is then linear and consumer surplus Bn
2 is given by the expression in (2) with po
2
replaced by pn
2 and Ko by Kn.
The incentives faced by the ¯rm in period 2 depend to some extent on whether it is also





















which is analogous to (3).
11For a ¯rm with altruism parameter ¹ a, the equilibrium price is pn
2(¹ a), which equals po¤
2 (¹ a;¹ c)
in (5). Its resulting level of period 2 welfare is W n
2 (¹ a;po¤
2 (¹ a;¹ c))). A sel¯sh ¯rm also charges
po¤
2 (¹ a;¹ c) if ¢(0;¹ c) ¸ 0, and its period 2 welfare is then W n
2 (0) = W n
2 (0;po¤
2 (¹ a;¹ c))). If,
instead, ¢(0;¹ c) < 0, the sel¯sh ¯rm charges pn
2(0) = po¤
2 (0;¹ c) and its resulting welfare is
W n
2 (0) = (1 ¡ °)W o
n(0;po¤
2 (0;¹ c))). Note that, in either case, W n
2 (¹ a) > W n
2 (0). This occurs
both because the altruistic ¯rm enjoys vicariously the welfare of its consumers and because
the altruistic ¯rm is able to charge its optimal price without fear of punishment.
2.2 Period 1
If the entrant is altruistic, her utility depends on the level of consumer surplus, which depends
in turn on the quality of the good. While consumers only learn this quality after their
purchase is complete, the seller knows it before and can thus compute the surplus that
consumers will obtain ex post. This surplus depends on the quality provided, on the price
that consumers pay and on the quantity that they purchase. Using the equilibrium demand
curve, it can be written as a function of only price and quality so it equals Bn
1(pn
1;high)
when quality is high and Bn
1(pn
1;low) when it is low. As a result, an entrant with an altruism
parameter of a prefers to produce high to low quality in period 1 if
W
n








1;low)) ¸ ·: (10)












1 ¡ ¹ c) ¸ ·; (11)
where qn
1 is the quantity sold. Lastly, this entrant prefers to produce a low quality good to









1 ¡ ¹ c) > 0: (12)
An equilibrium where all entrants supply high quality exists if a price can be found such
that (10) and (11) are satis¯ed when the demand at this price is given by (8) and such that
12the entering ¯rm does not wish to deviate from this price. This equilibrium involves some
coordination between the actions of producers and the beliefs of consumers, since demand
is only given by (8) if consumers believe that high quality is forthcoming.
I ¯rst analyze a benchmark case where all entrants are sel¯sh and ° = 0 so that ¯rms are
not punished for their sel¯shness. Even so, W n
2 (0) still denotes the welfare of these entrants
in period 2 if they provide high quality. This benchmark case provides a useful contrast
for the analysis where consumers expect ¯rms to be altruistic. The following proposition
characterizes equilibria in this case




2 (0) ¸ · (13)
Proofs are in the Appendix.
Ignoring setup costs, pro¯ts in period 1 are the same whether the ¯rm produces high
or low quality. Thus, the sel¯sh ¯rm's choice of high as opposed to low quality is based
exclusively on whether second period pro¯ts cover the setup costs.
Consider now the incentives faced by an altruistic ¯rm. For such a ¯rm, the choice
between high and low quality depends also on the e®ect of quality on consumer welfare. The
bene¯ts of high quality a®ect (11) and (10) equally (since both conditions involve comparing
the provision of high quality to an alternate course of action) while the losses from low
quality a®ect only (10). To determine the conditions under which (11) is a tighter constraint
than (10), one must compute the size of losses when quality is low.
From the utility function (7), consumers lose (L¡pn
1) = (¹ c¡²¡pn
1) for each low quality
unit that they buy at a price of pn










Conditions (11) and (10) are thus identical when the price pn
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1 ¡ ¹ c) or ~ p
n




13For prices above ~ pn
1, (10) is a tighter constraint because sales are so pro¯table that abstaining
from production is not attractive to the ¯rm. By contrast, for a low price close to ¹ c, ¯rm
pro¯ts are negligible but consumer losses are not because ² > 0. Thus, the vicarious losses
to an altruistic ¯rm from providing low quality exceeds its pro¯ts and the constraint (11)
that keeps the ¯rm from not producing at all is tighter than the constraint that the ¯rm
prefer high to low quality.
As mentioned above, I let ² be relatively small. I suppose, in particular, that ² is small
enough that the critical price ~ pn
1 is smaller than the altruistic ¯rm's desired price. Using (5),
the latter equals (¹ c + (1 ¡ ¹ a)Y )=(2 ¡ ¹ a), so that it is always possible to ¯nd an ² such that
~ pn
1 is below this.
It is useful to study the special case where all ¯rms are known to have an altruism
parameter ¹ a. Demand is then given by Kn(1¡pn
1=Y ) and consumer welfare can be computed
as in (2) so that Bn
1(pn
1;high) equals Kn[Y ¡ pn
1]2=2Y . If this price pn
1 is above the critical
price ~ pn
1, high quality is provided if (10) is satis¯ed. This requires that
W
n










































[¹ c ¡ ² ¡ p
n];
which is negative as long as ¯rms do not charge prices below ¹ c ¡ ². Since ¹ c ¡ ² is below the
critical price, this analysis demonstrates that high quality becomes easier to sustain when
the price is lowered from the price that is optimal towards the critical price ~ pn
1.
For pn

















1 ¡ ¹ c) ¸ ·: (17)
It is apparent that the left hand side reaches a maximum at po¤
2 (¹ a;¹ c), the price that
¯rms wish to charge for high quality. Moreover, since the expression is quadratic in the
price, it declines monotonically as the price is lowered below this. This means that high
14quality becomes harder to sustain as the price is lowered below the critical price. Putting
this together with the argument above, it follows that high quality cannot be sustained at
any price if it cannot be sustained at the critical price ~ pn
1. If ¯rms do supply high quality at
this price, the price that they charge in equilibrium is either the highest price that satis¯es
(16) or the ¯rms preferred price po¤
2 (¹ a;¹ c), whichever is smaller.
Retaining for the moment the assumption that ° = 0, I now turn to the question of
whether high quality continues to be provided when some ¯rms are altruistic while others
are not. Suppose that entrants have a probability ¹ of having an altruism parameter equal
to ¹ a and that they have a probability (1 ¡ ¹) of being sel¯sh. I focus on the case where
(13) is violated, because this assures that sel¯sh ¯rms prefer to provide low rather than high
quality. The question is then whether this incentive to provide low quality by a fraction
(1 ¡ ¹) of ¯rms is su±cient to prevent altruists from o®ering high quality as well.
One determinant of this is the inequality
¹Y + (1 ¡ ¹)L ¸ ¹ c or ¹(Y + ² ¡ ¹ c) ¸ ²: (18)
If this inequality is satis¯ed, consumers who value the high quality good at Y (µ's largest
possible value) are willing to pay the marginal cost of production of the new good even if
only altruistic suppliers provide high quality. If (18) is not satis¯ed, there is no equilibrium
where the altruistic ¯rms provide high quality while the sel¯sh ones provide low quality.
The reason is that sel¯sh ¯rms stand ready to sell low quality goods if the price equals at
least ¹ c, but the violation of (18) implies that there would be no demand for the new good
at a price of ¹ c even if altruistic ¯rms sold high quality goods at this price. Higher prices
reduce consumer's willingness to buy a good of uncertain quality even further. Lower prices,
instead, lead the sel¯sh low quality ¯rms to leave the market. Note that (18) is more likely
to be violated when ¹ is low so that true altruism is relatively rare. Indeed, one can always
¯nd a ¹ low enough that (18) is violated.
If, instead, (18) is satis¯ed, there is at least the potential for a \mixed" equilibrium
where altruistic ¯rms sell high quality and sel¯sh ¯rms sell low quality. Consumers for
15whom (¹µ +(1¡¹)L) exceeds the price pn
1 buy the good so that its demand dn












One immediate property of this demand worth curve is that its derivative with respect to ¹
equals (Kn=Y )(pn
1 ¡ L)=¹2. Since L is smaller than the marginal cost ¹ c, this is positive if
any goods are actually sold. It follows that this demand rises when the ¯rm is more likely
to be selling high quality.
A mixed equilibrium with a price above ¹ c requires that (10) and (11) hold for the altruistic
¯rms at this price. The following proposition demonstrates that these conditions are more
stringent than in the case where it is common knowledge that all ¯rms are altruistic (so that
¹ = 1).
Proposition 2. For any p ¸ ¹ c, Bn
1(p;high) and ¡Bn
1(p;low) are higher when ¹ = 1 than
when ¹ < 1.
These conditions establish that, for any given price, the left hand side of (10) and (11)
are larger when ¹ = 1 so that these conditions are easier to meet. The intuition for this
result is straightforward. When some ¯rms are providing low quality, demand is lower so
that a ¯rm producing high quality generates less consumer surplus. Similarly, the reduced
sales mean that total customer losses are not as large if consumers buy low rather than high
quality. The vicarious bene¯ts of providing high quality are therefore reduced and this mutes
altruists' incentives to raise quality.
A sel¯sh ¯rm is unwilling to sell goods at a price below ¹ c when (13) is violated. A ¯rm
that is willing to sell at such a price is thus necessarily altruistic.10 Relative to not selling
any good at all, an altruistic ¯rm is worse o® selling a low quality good at a price below ¹ c,
since it incurs losses that cannot be made up by gains from consumers. Thus, a ¯rm that
charges less than ¹ c must be selling a high quality good with the result that its the demand
10The model thus allows a low price to be used as a signal of quality. See Bagwell and Riordan (1991)
for a model where, because high quality goods cost more than low quality ones, it is high prices that can be
signals of quality.
16curve is (8). If the price together with the resulting level of sales satis¯es (10), the altruistic
¯rm is indeed willing to provide high quality at this price. This can yield an equilibrium
with high quality even if (18) is violated. Note, however, that if a price below ¹ c satis¯es (10)
so does a price equal to the critical value ~ pn
1. This means that the parameters that lead all
new suppliers to supply high quality when ¹ < 1 also imply that all ¯rms would produce
high quality if ¹ were equal to one.
The reverse is obviously not true, however. There are parameters such that (10) is
satis¯ed by the critical price, which can exceed ¹ c by a substantial margin, but where this
condition is not satis¯ed by ¹ c so that altruistic ¯rms would be unwilling to sell high quality
at this price. If, in addition, (18) is violated, there is no mixed equilibrium in which altruistic
¯rms produce high quality.
This has established that the possibility that ¯rms might be sel¯sh reduces the range of
parameters for which high quality provision is an equilibrium. It is also immediately obvious
that in the cases where (18) is satis¯ed and altruistic ¯rms produce high quality at a price
above ¹ c, the demand for the new good at a given price is lower than when sel¯sh ¯rms are
absent.
So far, the discussion in this section has been carried out setting ° = 0 so that consumers
are not concerned with the altruism of ¯rms. As I now show, however, a positive ° does not
facilitate the provision of high quality by new entrants. Indeed, it makes this slightly more
di±cult. To see this, note ¯rst that a positive ° has no e®ect on altruistic ¯rms since these
are already acting in accord with the expectations of altruism-aware consumers. A positive
° does a®ect sel¯sh ¯rms because it reduces W n
2 (0), the welfare of these ¯rms in period 2 if
they provide high quality. The reason is that they must either charge a price they regard as
suboptimal or lose a fraction (1 ¡ °) of their customers. This reduction in W n
2 (0) makes it
more di±cult to satisfy (13), and therefore more di±cult for them to provide high quality.
When condition (13) is violated, the analysis of sel¯sh ¯rms is the same as when ° = 0.
As in that case, sel¯sh ¯rms provide low quality if they enter and charge the same price as
altruists. Consumers realize this and lower their demand for goods accordingly.
17In summary, this section shows that the presence of sel¯sh potential entrants reduces
the range of parameters such that high quality is provided by all ¯rms that sell the new
good. When consumers do not expect to receive high quality, their demand for the new
good at any given price is obviously lower. In spite of this, there are circumstances where a
new good is provided either at a price so low that only altruistic ¯rms sell it or at a higher
price that leads sel¯sh ¯rms to provide a low quality good. In either case, the provision
of a high quality good can demonstrate, ex post that the ¯rm must have been altruistic to
start with. This matters for the analysis because it suggests that consumers may be rational
when they expect altruism from ¯rms that already o®er high quality products. This is true,
particularly, if the parameters are such that sel¯sh ¯rms would have either not introduced a
product at all or would have introduced a low quality good.
3 The Introduction of the New Good by an Incumbent
Brand
I now consider the possibility that the new good is introduced by the ¯rm that produces
the old good. By using the same brand, the ¯rm can make it clear to consumers that the
¯rm producing both goods is the same. If the old good is of su±ciently high quality that
consumers regard this ¯rm as being altruistic towards its target customers, this common
branding can convey information about the altruism of the ¯rm producing the new good. A
key issue, however, is the extent to which altruism for customers of the old good is related
to altruism for consumers of the new one. One possibility is that altruism is a general
disposition so that ¯rms are either sel¯sh or they are equally altruistic towards all people.
This seems implausible, in part because individuals often appear to be selective in their
generosity and their altruism. Krebs (1975), for example, presents evidence that individuals
are more likely to feel empathy and be generous towards people who are similar to themselves.
This ¯ts with the fact that many successful businesses were started to solve a problem faced
by segments of the population that the founder belonged to.11 The selectivity of expected
11Kevin Plank's founding of the company Under Armour is a leading example of this.
18¯rm altruism also ¯ts with Fournier's (1998) demonstration that many individuals have
personal relationships with particular brands, and that this leads consumers like the one
discussed in the introduction to expect particularly good treatment from them.
This selectivity implies that there exist two related measures of \¯t" between a brand's
existing product and its new product extension. The ¯rst is the extent to which consumers
believe that altruism towards consumers of the old product implies altruism towards the
consumers of the new. The second is the extent to which altruism-aware consumers of
the old product become angry when the new product's quality allows them to reject the
hypothesis that the ¯rm is altruistic towards the consumers of the new product.12 This
second measure of ¯t presupposes that altruism-aware consumers expect a brand that was
altruistic towards the consumers of the old good to be altruistic towards the consumers of
their brand extension as well. This second measure requires, in addition, that altruism-aware
consumers of the old product be aware of the quality of the new one, which is most easily
satis¯ed if they consume both. Fit should thus be very tight along both dimensions when
the old and new products of a brand are meant to be used at the same time by the same
consumers.
The ¯rst dimension of ¯t can be captured by the parameter ¹, which gives the probability
that the new product is provided by an altruistic ¯rm. Condition (18) is violated for ¹
su±ciently low while it is satis¯ed for large values of ¹. Thus, an increase in ¹ can allow
an equilibrium where altruistic ¯rms provide high quality to exist where it would not exist
otherwise. Note, however, that true altruism by ¯rms is still needed for high quality to be
forthcoming. Once (18) is satis¯ed, an increase in ¹ has the further e®ect of raising demand
for the new product, which is given by (19). Both of these e®ects facilitate the introduction
of new goods by incumbents whose old product leads them to be perceived as altruistic
12This assumes that altruism-aware consumers who expect more altruism from a company become angry
in response to actions they would tolerate from others, so that they impose higher standard on these ¯rms.
Some evidence for the view that expected altruism leads people to be more angry at sel¯sh acts can be
found in Ohbuschi et al. (2004). They show that people are angered when people who are close to them
engage in actions that do not, for example, take proper account of their feelings while anger is less likely to
be triggered in response to such behavior from people who are less close.
19towards the customers of the new good.
The importance of the second dimension of ¯t can be studied by analyzing whether the
potential willingness of altruism-aware consumers to become angry at ¯rms that provide low
quality further increases the demand for new goods in equilibrium. To carry out this analysis,
I start by supposing that altruism aware consumers do indeed perceive the provision of a
low quality new good as demonstrating insu±cient altruism. I demonstrate that this leads
altruistic ¯rms to provide high quality in some circumstances. It follows that, under these
circumstances, there is an equilibrium in which it is rational for altruism-aware consumer to
become angry at an incumbent that introduces a low quality new good. One consequence of
this analysis is that, for certain parameters, sel¯sh ¯rms also provide high quality new goods
even though (13) is violated so that sel¯sh ¯rms would only provide low quality if there were
no altruism-aware consumers.
Under the assumption that altruism-aware customers become angry at the provision of
low quality, sel¯sh ¯rms that introduce a low quality good lose ¢(0;c) in the second period.
Thus, the condition under which a sel¯sh ¯rm prefers producing high quality rather than
low quality ceases to be (10) and becomes
W
n
2 (0) + ¢(0;c) ¸ ·: (20)
Similarly, the condition under which such a ¯rm prefers to produce a low quality good rather





1 ¡ ¹ c) ¡ ¢(0;c) > 0: (21)
The condition (11) that the sel¯sh ¯rm prefer the production of high quality to not
producing the new good remains unchanged. It can be rewritten as
W
n




1 ¡ ¹ c) ¸ ·: (22)
The changes in (10) and (12) make it easier for equilibria where high quality goods are
produced to exist. This is demonstrated in the next two propositions.
20Proposition 3. Consider a price pn
1 which is an equilibrium with high quality in the case
where ¹ = 1. Then both altruistic and sel¯sh ¯rms provide high quality new products at this
price when ¹ < 1 as long as a) (20) is satis¯ed and b) (22) is satis¯ed when qn
1 is given by
F n(1 ¡ pn
1=Y ).
To see that this proposition implies that high quality is easier to provide when ¯rms
have an existing product, note that sel¯sh new entrants are unwilling to provide high quality
unless (13) is satis¯ed. Moreover (13) is more di±cult to satisfy than either (20) or (22).
Thus, when (13) is violated while (20) and (22) are satis¯ed at pn
1, the fact that new goods
are being provided by existing brands ensures that all suppliers o®er high quality. What is
attractive about this proposition is that it covers a case where ¯rms provide high quality not
because they are in fact altruistic but only because they pretend to be.
In the next proposition, (22) is violated so that sel¯sh ¯rms are not induced to supply
high quality. Nonetheless, consumer anger continues to play a role in expanding the provision
of high quality goods by incumbents.
Proposition 4. Let ^ pn
1 denote the minimum of the critical price ~ pn
1 and the price that makes
(21) hold as an equality when qn
1 is given by F n(1 ¡ ~ pn
1=Y ). Then, if (10) and (11) are
satis¯ed at this price while (22) is not, altruistic ¯rms provide high quality while sel¯sh ¯rms
do not sell the new good.
What occurs here is that the fear of losing customers for its old good is su±cient to
ensure that sel¯sh ¯rms do not provide low quality, though it is not enough to actually lead
them to produce high quality new goods. Nonetheless, the lack of low quality provision by
sel¯sh ¯rms helps altruistic ones sell high quality goods. Recall that, when new goods were
provided by new entrants, altruists had to charge a price below ¹ c to prevent sel¯sh ¯rms
from selling low quality goods in the case where (13) was violated. When the new good is
sold by incumbent ¯rms, sel¯sh ¯rms require a price premium above ¹ c to be willing to sell a
low quality good (because doing so leads to a loss in period 2). The fact that sel¯sh ¯rms are
now deterred even with a price above ¹ c helps altruistic ¯rms provide high quality because
21condition (11) becomes easier to meet as the price rises from ¹ c to the critical price ~ pn
1.
4 High-end versus Broad Brands
The previous section has shown that incumbent brands have an advantage over new entrants
when the perception that an incumbent is altruistic towards her existing customers leads
potential buyers of the new good to expect this altruism to be directed towards them also.
Being perceived as altruistic can thus be regarded as an asset, a form of brand equity. This
raises the question of whether the demand for a brand's new products is strictly increasing
in the number of people that it is perceived as being altruistic towards, or whether it can
be more valuable for a brand to be regarded as being altruistic only towards a limited set of
customers. This section shows that the latter is true.
To demonstrate this, I suppose that there are two types of ¯rms. Firms of type b are
altruistic towards all their potential customers while ¯rms of type x are altruistic only towards
the most quality-sensitive subset of these customers. Consumers know the ¯rms' types as a
result of earlier purchases and, for this reason I neglect both the existence of sel¯sh ¯rms and
the possibility that consumers will be angry at ¯rms that provide insu±cient quality. Since
both types of ¯rms are in fact altruistic towards their more quality conscious customers,
actions that are consistent with altruism towards this group of customers would not induce
anger according to (1). Actions that denote altruism only towards these individuals, and not
towards less quality conscious customers, have the potential for inducing anger by these less
quality conscious customers. This provides an additional incentive for ¯rms whose altruism
is broader to act di®erently from those whose altruism is narrower. The section demonstrates
that these two kind of ¯rms can act di®erently even without this additional incentive.
This section shows that ¯rms of type x, whose altruism is narrower, sometimes have a
higher incentive to improve their quality. The reason is that they have less to gain from
doing what price-sensitive customers want, which is to ultimately cut costs. The result is
that ¯rms of type x can have a higher demand for their new product than ¯rms of type b.
Because type b ¯rms would also like to have a high demand, the conditions that ensure this
22are nontrivial. They are, in e®ect, conditions under which there is no price such that it is
credible for ¯rms of type b to o®er goods in high demand.
To develop these conditions, I once again consider a situation where ¯rms can introduce
goods whose value to consumers depends on the consumer's realized value of µ. The level
of quality of the new good is given by a parameter m so that the value of these goods to
consumers equals mµ.13 All consumers prefer goods with a higher value of m, and this
preference is particularly strong for people whose realized µ is large. The key choice faced
by ¯rms in this section is whether to choose a high or a low value for m.
Since consumers with higher values of µ are more quality sensitive, it is appealing to
suppose that \high-end" ¯rms care only about consumers with relatively high values of µ.
As a result, I assume that the altruism parameter of ¯rms of type x equals ¹ a for consumers
whose µ lies between X and Y while it equals zero for consumers with lower values of µ.
By contrast, ¯rms of type b have an altruism parameter equal to ¹ a for all their potential
customers.
4.1 Period 2
In period 2, customers know that the good is worth mµ to them. Since I am treating
customers as pursuing only their material rewards, they purchase the good if mµ exceeds the
price pn
2 so that demand is Kn(1 ¡ pn
2=mY ). Adapting the analysis of section 1, the logic
of (2) implies that total consumer welfare is Kn(mY ¡ pn
2)2=2mY , while that of (5) implies




mY (1 ¡ ¹ a) + c
2 ¡ ¹ a
; (23)
where c is marginal cost and the superscript b denotes the ¯rm's type. For future reference,
it is worth recording µ¡, the lowest µ which still leads customers to buy. Since this equals
pn
2=m, it is given by
µ
¡ =
(1 ¡ ¹ a)Y + c=m
2 ¡ ¹ a
: (24)
13The earlier analysis corresponds to the case where m could e®ectively equal only 0 or 1.
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The restriction that some ¯rms care only for consumers with µ > X matters only if
X > µ¡, and this ¯ts with the idea that these ¯rms care only about the keenest consumers.
I thus assume this is true for ¯rms of type x. As I show momentarily, these ¯rms then sell





















This expression can easily be interpreted. It equals the number of buyers with µ between X
and Y , which is Kn(1 ¡ X=Y ), times their average surplus, which is m(X + Y )=2.
In period 2, a ¯rm of type x maximizes
W
x



























mY + c ¡ ¹ am(Y ¡ X)
2
: (28)
The maximum µ that buys at this price is px
2, and it is immediately veri¯ed that this is lower
than X if X > µ¡, so that, indeed, all individuals with µ ¸ X buy the good. The price px
2 is
increasing in X because higher values of X lead ¯rms to care about fewer customers so that
their vicarious gain from lowering their price is reduced. A ¯rm with X = Y cares about no
customers so that it acts as if its altruism parameter ¹ a were equal to zero. At the opposite
extreme, a ¯rm that cares for all its customers acts as if X were equal to µ¡, and is optimal
price is (23).
One clear and unsurprising implication of (27) is that the ¯rm is better o® if either quality
































The ¯rst of these expressions is positive because pn
2 exceeds marginal cost while the second
is negative because demand is positive only if pn
2 is smaller than mY . These signs imply that
one can always ¯nd a combination of an increase in c and an increase in m that leave overall
¯rm welfare constant.
The sign of the derivatives in (29) and (30) is independent of the size of the parameters
¹ a and X. It is immediately apparent, however, that the size of these derivatives depends on
X both directly and through the dependence of the price px
2 on X. This is the basis of the
¯nding that increases in X starting at its lowest possible value of px
2=m raise the desirability
of increasing c and m simultaneously. This is demonstrated in the following proposition
Proposition 5. Consider a combination of in¯nitesimal increases in c and m that leaves
W b
2 unchanged when X = µ¡. Then, this combination increases W x
2 (X) when X is strictly
above µ¡.
Reductions in c (combined with reductions in m) tend to be relatively more attractive
to ¯rms that care for all their customers for two main reasons. The ¯rst is that such ¯rms
tend to charge lower prices and sell correspondingly more, so they obtain the savings from
cost reductions on more units. Second, all consumers bene¯t equally from a cost reduction
(though its e®ect on the price that they pay) whereas the bene¯ts of an increase in m accrues
disproportionately to consumers with high values of µ. This means that, even though a ¯rm
that cares about all its consumers receives a larger total vicarious bene¯t from an increase
in m than a ¯rm that cares only for a subset (because all consumers gain something), its
vicarious bene¯ts from a reduction in c are relatively larger.
While Proposition 5 deals only with marginal changes, its validity for all X > µ¡ implies
that it has global implications. Suppose, in particular, that we consider any pair of c and m
25combinations that give the same welfare to a ¯rm of type b. One can then reach the higher
fc;mg combination from the lower one by a series of in¯nitesimal changes, each of which
leaves the ¯rm of type b indi®erent and each of which makes the ¯rm of type x better o®.
This latter ¯rm thus strictly prefers the combination with the higher m.
Figure 1 shows this graphically for Y = 10 and ¹ a = :5. For each m between .3 and
1, the top panel depicts the level of c such that the combination fc;mg makes the value
of W b
2 the same as when m = 1 and c = 5. The bottom panel then depicts both W b
(which is a constant) and W x when X is such that the narrowly altruistic ¯rm cares only
for those consumers that buy when m = 1 and c = 5 and the price is set according to (23).
At this point, both types of ¯rms care about the same customers so the two welfare levels
are identical. For lower values of m, the ¯rm that cares about the most quality conscious
consumers is worse o®. It should be noted, however, that the reductions in ¯rm welfare are
modest even though the changes in cost and quality considered in this Figure are substantial.
Figure 2 depicts the converse situation. For the same Y and ¹ a, it lets c vary with m
so that W x is una®ected. Again, X is chosen so both ¯rms get the same welfare when m
and c are at the highest values I consider. Now, however, reductions in m are matched by
reductions in c that keep W x constant. This means that W b rises with c, since a ¯rm that
cares for all its consumers bene¯ts more from simultaneous reductions in c and m.
This section thus has demonstrated that it is possible to ¯nd two fc;mg combinations
such that ¯rms of type b derive more welfare in period 2 from the one with lower m while
those of type x derive more period 2 welfare from the one with higher m. This is not a
general result and there are, of course, numerous situations where both types of ¯rms prefer
the same fc;mg combination. The model does make testable predictions, however, as to
when the two kinds of ¯rms have the same preferences and when they do not.
4.2 Period 1
In this period, ¯rms can either introduce a good with quality mH or one with quality mL <
mH. The marginal cost of these goods in the second period is cH and cL respectively, with
26cL < cH. For illustration, I suppose that both goods have a marginal cost of cH in the ¯rst
period, though this is not essential for the results. Lastly, the period 1 setup costs for these
two goods are ·H and ·L.
The previous subsection established that there exist combinations of parameters such
that, once the welfare functions W b
2(m;c) and W x
2 (m;c;X) have been maximized with respect


















For the numerical example considered above, for example, these inequalities are satis¯ed
when cH = 5, cL = 1:43, mH = 1, and mL = :5. With these parameters, welfare is about 2
percent higher for the broadly altruistic ¯rm when it has low costs and low quality rather
than high costs and high quality. For a ¯rm that cares only about the equilibrium purchasers
of the good with high cost and high quality, welfare is about one third of one percent lower
when it has low costs and low quality instead.
In the analysis so far, periods 1 and 2 have been treated as having the same length and
discounting between the periods has been neglected. However, the length of time during
which the quality of a good is relatively uncertain might well be di®erent from the length
of time during which this quality is relatively well understood and the good continues to
be sold. Indeed, one can imagine that for many products the uncertainty dissolves quickly
relative to the life of the product. In this case, the present value of the welfare the ¯rm






2 i = b;x:
The parameter ½ captures both discounting and the relative length of periods 1 and 2.14
One di®erence between period 1 and period 2 is that consumers do not know m in
the former. Letting me denote consumer's expectation of m, consumer demand is Kn(1 ¡
14Suppose one slices period 2 into n periods of time of the same length as period 1 and lets ~ ½ denote the
discount rate between period 1 and the ¯rst of these subperiods of period 2. Then ½ = ~ ½(1 ¡ ~ ½n)=(1 ¡ ~ ½),
which rises with n and ~ ½.
27pn
1=meY )). The welfare in period 1 of a broadly altruistic ¯rm that introduces a good of























































meY (1 ¡ ¹ a) + cH
2(1 ¡ ¹ a) + ¹ am=me: (33)
Price is increasing in perceived quality (because this increases demand). It is declining
in actual quality, however. While an increase in actual quality would have no e®ect on the
price of sel¯sh ¯rms (since it a®ects neither cost nor demand), it leads altruistic ones to wish
to sell more because consumers gain more from their purchases.


















This expression is positive when pn
1 > cH (which is guaranteed if the ¯rm acts optimally) and
me ¸ m. A reduction in me (for given m) leads consumers to lower their purchases. This
has only a second order e®ect on consumer welfare when m = me because consumers are
then receiving zero surplus from marginal purchases. For ¯rms, by contrast, the reduction
in purchases represents a ¯rst order reduction in pro¯ts. The result is that a ¯rm supplying
a good of quality mH has nothing to gain from being expected to supply a good of quality
mL while a ¯rm supplying quality mL would prefer to be seen as supply quality mH.















































28Di®erentiating with respect to pn
1, the optimal price px
1(m;me) depends only on me and is
given by the expression in (28) with m replaced by me. The earlier analysis thus demonstrates
again that the condition X ¸ µ¡ ensures that all consumers with µ ¸ X buy the good.
Inspection of (35) also shows that the derivative of W x
1 with respect to me is positive.
Since ¯rms have nothing to gain by pretending to be o®ering quality mL, a ¯rm that
o®ers this quality can charge the price that maximizes W i(mL;mL;p) with respect to p,
where i equals either b or x. Let pi
L denote this price, which equals either pb
1(mL;mL) or
px
1(mL;mL). By contrast, consumers would only believe that a ¯rm is o®ering a good of
quality mH at a price pi
H if they are certain that the ¯rm has no incentive to deviate and















































where i equals either b or x. The ¯rst of these conditions says that the ¯rm prefers to provide
high quality at pi
H, with consumers believing that quality is mH, to providing low quality
at pi
L when this price leads consumers to believe that quality is mL. This can be thought
of as ensuring that the ¯rm does not want to deviate in an overt way from providing high
quality. The second of these conditions requires the ¯rm to su®er a loss when it sells low
rather than high quality at the price pi
H even if the fact that it keeps the price constant at
pi
H leads consumers to believe that the ¯rm provides high quality. This condition prevents
the ¯rm from making a covert deviation in the quality it provides.
When these conditions are met, it is possible to sustain an outcome with high quality if
the price is pi
H. Among all outcomes with this level of quality, ¯rms of type i prefer the one
that makes the left hand side of (36) as large as possible, and this is a natural choice for an
equilibrium price (since ¯rms have no incentive to deviate from this price). It is also worth
noting that these conditions imply that ¯rms of type i prefer all the outcomes with prices
that lead quality to be equal to mH to the feasible outcomes where quality equals mL so
that, again, it seems reasonable to suppose that the equilibrium involves m = mH.
29Proposition 6. When (31) is satis¯ed, one can always ¯nd values of ½ and ·H ¡ ·L such
that there exists no price for which ¯rms of type b supply a good of quality mH while there
do exist prices for which ¯rms of type x do so.
This proposition captures the idea that demand for new products from narrowly altruistic
¯rms can be higher than demand for new products from broadly altruistic ones. In particular,
it shows that, for certain model parameters, there exists an equilibrium price px
H such that
narrowly altruistic ¯rms sell Kn(1 ¡ px
H=mHY ) units. Since broadly altruistic would be
expected to sell a good of quality mL, they would only sell Kn(1 ¡ px
H=mLY ) units if they
(counterfactually) charged this price.
5 Conclusions
This paper has sought to show that the association of a brand with altruism for a particular
group of consumers can explain some consumer attitudes for branded products. It can explain
both why consumers are quick to accept certain new product o®erings from particular brands,
but also why some brand extensions are regarded by consumers with suspicion. The model
also shows why it may be di±cult for brands to \move up" and acquire associations with
higher quality whereas \moving down" and generating demand by consumers with limited
quality sensitivity may be easier. The reason is that people expect high quality not so much
from brands that they regard as having a particular a®ection for themselves but rather from
brands that they regard as devoted to their most quality-sensitive purchasers.
While the model seems to have promise for explaining both some of the advantages and
some limitations of incumbent brands relative to newcomers, there may well be aspects
of this phenomenon that are not consistent with the model developed here. This model
emphasizes that brands obtain credibility from the identity of the customers that buy their
core product as opposed to obtaining it from other brand associations. This means that
evidence suggesting that other brand associations are important in determining the success
of extension would require some modi¯cation of the model.
30A di®erent dimension of the model that would bene¯t from further analysis is the way
in the perceptions of a ¯rm's altruism evolves over time. As emphasized by Tadelis (1999),
some ¯rms lose their reputations for good quality over time. In the model of Tadelis (1999),
this is the result of reductions in quality that are the result of changes in ownership (where
some owners are intrinsically able to provide high quality while others are not). The model
developed here has the potential for providing a complementary explanation. This is that
new product introductions can lead customers to reject a hypothesis that they had earlier
accepted, namely that managers are su±ciently altruistic. Extending the model so that this
disappointment takes place in equilibrium (as opposed to being only a threat that induces
good behavior) would seem to be a promising avenue of future research.
The current paper focuses on only one aspect of the innovation process, namely the
extent to which ¯rms knowingly keep quality and development costs low when consumer are
unable to ascertain a good's quality before consumption. Altruism on the part of ¯rms may
also play a role in other situations of imperfect information, as when ¯rms are themselves
uncertain about the extent to which their development e®ort will ultimately yield a product
that consumers value. It thus seems worthwhile to gain a more general understanding of the
role of this kind of altruism in technical progress.
316 References
Aaker, David A. and Kevin L. Keller, \Consumer Evaluations of Brand Extensions,"
Journal of Marketing, 54, January 1990, 27-41.
Abrahams, Je®rey, The Mission Statement Book: 301 Corporate Mission Statements
from America's Top Companies, New York: Ten Speed Press, 2004.
Anderson, Eric T. and Duncan I. Simester, \Price Stickiness and Customer Antagonism,"
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2010 forthcoming.
Bagwell, Kyle and Michael H. Riordan, \ High and Declining Prices Signal Product
Quality," American Economic Review, 81, March 1991, 224{239.
Choi, Jay Pil, \Brand Extension as Informational Leverage," Review of Economic Stud-
ies, 65, October 1998, 655-69.
Broniarczyk, Susan M. and Joseph W. Alba, \The Importance of the Brand in Brand
Extension," Journal of Marketing, 21, May 1994, 214-28.
Cabral, Luis M. B., \Stretching Firm and Brand Reputation," Rand Journal of Eco-
nomics, 31, Winter 2000, 658{673.
Fournier, Susan, \Consumers and their brands: Developing relationship theory in con-
sumer research," Journal of Consumer Research, 24, March 1998, 343{373.
Keller, Kevin L., Strategic Brand Management, Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall,
1998.
Keller, Kevin L. and David A. Aaker, \The E®ects of Sequential Introduction of Brand
Extensions," Journal of Marketing Research, 29, February 1992, 35-50.
Klink, Richard R. and Daniel C. Smith, \Threats to the External Validity of Brand
Extension Research," Journal of Marketing Research,, 38, August 2001, 326-335.
Loken, Barbara and Roedder-John, Deborah, \Diluting brand beliefs: when do brand
extensions have a negative impact?, Journal of Marketing, 57, July 1993, 71-84.
Ohbuchi, Ken-Ichi, Toru Tamura, Brian M. Quigley, James T. Tedeschi, Mawaf Madi,
Michael Bind and Amelie Mummendey, \Anger, Blame, and Dimensions of Per-
ceived Norm Violations: Culture, Gender, and Relationships," Journal of Applied
Social Psychology, 34, August 2004, 1587{1603.
32Pina, Jose M., Eva Martinez, Leslie de Chernatony and Susan Drury, \The e®ect of ser-
vice brand extensions on corporate image An empirical model," European Journal
of Marketing, 40, 2006, 174-197.
Roedder-John, Deborah, Barbara Loken and Christopher Joiner, \The Negative Impact
of Extensions: Can Flagship Products Be Diluted?," Journal of Marketing, 62,
January 1998, 19-32.
Rotemberg, Julio J., \Minimally Acceptable Altruism and the Ultimatum Game." Jour-
nal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 66, June 2008, 457{76.
| , \Fair Pricing," Journal of the European Economic Association, 2010, forthcoming.
Sullivan, Mary, \Measuring Image Spillovers in Umbrella Branded Products," Journal of
Business, 63, 1990, 309-30.
Swaminathan, Vanitha, Richard J. Fox, and Srinivas K. Reddy, \The Impact of Brand
Extension Introduction on Choice," Journal of Marketing, 65, October 2001, 1-15.
Tadelis, Steven, \What's in a name? Reputation as a tradeable asset," American Eco-
nomic Review, 89, June 1999, 548{63.
Wernerfelt, Birger, \Umbrella Branding as a Signal of New Product Quality: An Example
of Signaling by Posting a Bond," RAND Journal of Economics, 19, 1988, 458-66.
33Appendix:
Derivation of ¢(a;co) Using the formula in (5) to substitute for both po¤
2 (¹ a;co) and
po¤
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and the expression in the text follows immediately.
Proof of Proposition 1: When consumers expect high quality, the price po¤
2 (0;¹ c) is
optimal for sel¯sh ¯rms. Since this yields positive pro¯ts, (13) implies that (10) and (11)
are satis¯ed at this price. Thus, the ¯rm wishes to provide high quality and has no reason
to deviate from this price. This establishes that a high quality equilibrium exists when (13)
is satis¯ed.
Conversely, the violation of this condition implies that (10) is violated as well so the ¯rm
prefers low to high quality at any price.
Proof of Proposition 2: Bn











Moreover, p ¸ ¹ c implies p ¡ ¹ c + ² > 0, which implies that (1 ¡ ¹)(p ¡ ¹ c + ²) > 0 when
¹ < 1. Therefore, [p ¡ (1 ¡ ¹)(¹ c ¡ ²)]=¹ > p. This means that, when ¹ < 1, µ goes between
a number strictly larger than p and Y in the integral above, whereas it goes between p and
Y when ¹ equals one. Therefore, Bn
1(p;high) is larger in the latter case.
Similarly, Bn








p ¡ (1 ¡ ¹)(¹ c ¡ ²)
¹
¶¸
(p ¡ ¹ c + ²)
34so that Bn
1(p;low) is also larger when ¹ = 1.
Proof of Proposition 3: If consumers expect high quality at pn
1, the quantity demanded
is F n(1¡pn
1=Y ). Moreover, because this is an equilibrium price when ¹ = 1, altruistic ¯rms
provide high quality if they expect sel¯sh ¯rms to do so. Moreover, if (20) and (22) are
satis¯ed at this price-quantity combination, sel¯sh ¯rms produce high quality as well since
they prefer this to producing low quality and to producing no new good. There is thus an
equilibrium where consumers expect high quality and both types of ¯rms supply it.
Proof of Proposition 4: With (22) failing so that the sel¯sh ¯rm prefers not to produce
over producing a high quality good, the de¯nition of ^ pn
1 leads the sel¯sh ¯rm not to produce
at all. This means that the altruistic's ¯rm's actions are guided by (10), (11) and (12).
Given that the ¯rst two inequalities are satis¯ed, altruistic ¯rms produce high quality.
Proof of Proposition 5: For clarity, I neglect most superscripts and subscripts of W,
a and p in this proof. Using (25), the cost c that leads ¯rms that care for all their consumers
to obtain a particular welfare level W satis¯es
c = mY ¡
p
2(2 ¡ a)mY W (39)
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When marginal cost is given by (39), the minimal value of X, namely µ¡ is
µ




Given this relationship. it turns out to be convenient to write X as




35so that X equals µ¡ when ³ is zero while it is strictly greater than µ¡ when ³ > 0. Note
that ³ is at most equal to one if the ¯rm feels any altruism at all. Using this value of X in






which is positive for all ³ between zero and one.





































The function W b
1(mL;mH;p) is quadratic in p and reaches its maximum at pb
1(mL;mH).
According to (33), pb
1(mL;mH) > pb
1(mH;mH) > pb





L). In addition, the fact that the right hand side of (34) is positive implies
that W b
1(mL;mH;pb




c. This means that, at the price
pb
H = pb
1(mH;mH), condition (37) is more stringent than condition (36) for ¯rms of type b.
Because the left hand side of (36) reaches a maximum at this price, any other price makes
condition (36) harder to meet. Therefore, if (36)) is violated at this price for ¯rms of type
b, there is no price that leads these ¯rms to supply quality mH.
In the case of ¯rms of type x, px
1(mL;mH) = px
1(mH;mH). Nonetheless, the fact that
(35) implies that W x
1 is strictly increasing in me also implies, through the envelope theorem,
that W x
1 (mL;mH;px




c. This implies that
condition (37) is more stringent than condition (36) for ¯rms of type x when the price px
H
equals px
1(mH;mH). As a result, ¯rms of type x are willing to supply quality mH at the price
px
1(mH;mH) if (37) is satis¯ed at this price.
The expressions for W b
1 and W x
1 in (32) and (35) respectively are linear in m with coef-
¯cients that depend only on ¹ a, Y X and pb
1=mH. Therefore Âi
c equals the derivative of W i
1
with respect to m times (mH ¡ mL) Moreover, the coe±cient on m is larger in the case of
W b
1 as long as pb





c, which in turn implies that Âb
o > Âx
c.



























The solution ½¤, (·H ¡ ·L)¤ of this system satis¯es ½¤ > 0, (·H ¡ ·L)¤ > 0 as long
as Âb
o > Âx
c and (W x
2 (mH;cH;X) ¡ W x
2 (mL;cL;X)) > 0 > (W b
2(mH;cH) ¡ W b
2(mL;cL)).
The former is demonstrated above and the latter is implied by (31). Therefore, ½ > ½¤
and (·H ¡ ·L) = (·H ¡ ·L)¤ lead to (37) being satis¯ed for ¯rms of type x at a price of
px
1(mH;mH) while (36) is not satis¯ed for ¯rms of type b at a price of pb
1(mH;mH).
Table 1
Timing of the model
Period 0 1 2







37Figure 1: Variations in m and c that keep W b constant


































38Figure 2: Variations in m and c that keep W x constant










0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0.84
0.86
0.88
0.9
m
F
i
r
m
 
W
e
l
f
a
r
e
W
b
W
x
39